Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver, Colorado, et al., Petitioners v. Sylvia Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al. Supreme Court of United States by Nuse, Marguerite A
Seton Hall University
eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship Seton Hall Law
2016
Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged,
Denver, Colorado, et al., Petitioners v. Sylvia
Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human Services,
et al. Supreme Court of United States
Marguerite A. Nuse
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Nuse, Marguerite A., "Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver, Colorado, et al., Petitioners v. Sylvia Burwell, Secretary of
Health and Human Services, et al. Supreme Court of United States" (2016). Law School Student Scholarship. 901.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/901
1 
 
Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, 
Denver, Colorado, et al., Petitioners 
v. 
Sylvia Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al. 
 
Supreme Court of United States 
 
 
Maggie Nuse 
Religion and the First Amendment 
August 16, 2016  
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Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In these cases, we must decide whether the Accommodations available to nonprofit 
religious organizations regarding the contraceptive mandate in the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (Lexis 2015), violate either 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq. (Lexis 2015), or the 
Establishment Clause in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. 
amend. I (Lexis 2015).  In deciding whether RFRA has been violated, we must consider whether 
the Accommodations place a substantial burden on nonprofits and, if so, whether that burden is 
incurred through the least restrictive means of serving a compelling governmental interest.  The 
Establishment Clause is violated when church and state are sufficiently entangled.  We hold that 
the Accommodations violate neither RFRA nor the Establishment Clause and are therefore 
enforceable. 
To reach this holding, we first must decide whether the Accommodations available to 
nonprofit religious groups impose a substantial burden on the groups, and we hold that they do 
not.  We reject the Little Sisters’ argument that the Accommodations place a substantial burden 
on them because they must choose between sacrificing their morals and paying a hefty penalty.  
Brief for Petitioners in No. ___ p. 1.  To the contrary, the Accommodations alleviate any burden 
the ACA creates. 
Supposing that the Accommodations do inflict a substantial burden on the religious 
nonprofits, which they do not, the next step in the analysis would be to determine whether the 
government has a compelling interest in requiring the mandate and whether it achieves this 
interest by the least restrictive means.  We hold that the governmental interest which is furthered 
by the mandate, full healthcare for women, is compelling.  Additionally, the means by which the 
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U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) achieves this compelling interest are 
the least restrictive methods of doing so. 
In our holding, we also reject the Little Sisters’ contention that the Accommodations 
violate the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause by exempting churches from the mandate 
but not exempting all religious nonprofits.  Brief for Petitioners, No. ___ p. 33.  Many other 
areas of law, such as taxation and employment discrimination, make a similar distinction 
between groups with a primarily religious purpose and other religiously affiliated nonprofit 
organizations.  The wall of separation between church and state has not been tarnished.  
Therefore, the distinction the HHS has made is constitutional. 
Our decision today concludes that the Accommodations provided to religious nonprofit 
organizations violate neither RFRA nor the Establishment Clause.  The decision of the 10th 
Circuit Court is affirmed. 
 
I. 
A. 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was enacted in 2010 as an attempt by 
Congress to improve the type and quality of insurance employers are required to provide their 
employees.  At the same time, Congress wanted to make sure that these increased benefits would 
not impose any additional costs on the employees.  Specifically, the ACA requires employers to 
provide “minimum essential coverage,” which includes furnishing “preventive care and 
screenings.” 26 U.S.C. §4980H(a), 42 U.S.C. §300gg-13(a)(4) (Lexis 2015).  Congress chose to 
include these preventive services in the ACA because it determined that broader and more 
consistent use of preventive services is critical to improving public health and that people are 
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more likely to obtain appropriate preventive care when they do not have to pay for it out of 
pocket. 78 Fed. Reg. 39,872 (July 2, 2013); See Priests for Life v. HHS, 772 F.3d 229, 259- 260 
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (PFL).  Instead of defining the types of preventive care which must be covered, 
Congress authorized the Health Resources and Services Administration (“HRSA”) to make this 
determination.  HRSA, in turn, released the Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines which set 
forth that employers must provide “coverage, without cost sharing” for “[a]ll Food and Drug 
Administration approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education 
and counseling.” 77 Fed. Reg. 8725. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 
(2014). 
Within this contraceptive mandate, HRSA carved out an exemption for “religious 
employers.”  HRSA has defined this term as “an employer that is organized and operates as a 
nonprofit entity and is referred to in section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the [Internal Revenue] 
Code.”  These sections refer to “churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or 
associations of churches, as well as the exclusively religious activities of any religious order.”  
Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151, 1161-1162 (10th Cir. 
2015). 
In addition to the exemptions, the HHS established an accommodation for religious 
nonprofit groups who do not qualify as a religious employer yet object to the contraceptive 
mandate on religious grounds.  A religious nonprofit organization qualifies for the 
accommodation if it: (1) has religious objections to "providing coverage for some or all of the 
contraceptive services required to be covered" under the mandate, (2) "is organized and operates 
as a nonprofit entity," (3) "holds itself out as a religious organization," and (4) "self-certifies that 
it satisfies the first three criteria." Id. at1162.  The accommodation can be utilized by both 
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insured group health plans and self-insured group health plans in one of two ways: the 
organization may either self-certify or send notice to the HHS. 
Religious nonprofit groups may execute their accommodation by self-certifying through 
an “EBSA Form 700 Certification” (the “EBSA Form”).  The most pertinent sentence of the 
EBSA Form states: “I certify that, on account of religious objections, the organization opposes 
providing coverage for some or all of any contraceptive services that would otherwise be 
required to be covered; the organization is organized and operates as a nonprofit entity; and the 
organization holds itself out as a religious organization.”  The organization must provide a copy 
of the EBSA Form to the health insurance issuer (for insured health plans) or a third party 
administrator (for self-insured health plans).  The EBSA Form also instructs the health insurance 
issuer or third party administrator (“TPA”) that certain regulations require the issuer or TPA to 
provide the contraceptive coverage themselves without cost sharing to the employees. Id. at 
1163. 
Following backlash from various groups concerning the filing of the EBSA Form, 
another accommodation was developed for objecting religious nonprofit organizations.  As set 
out in Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014), religious nonprofit groups do not 
have to file and deliver an EBSA Form but can instead directly notify the HHS of their objection 
(the “Wheaton accommodation”).  It is then upon the HHS to contact the applicable insurance 
issuer and require that issuer to provide the coverage.  The objecting group must only provide the 
HHS with the minimum information necessary for the department to determine which entities are 
covered by the accommodation, to administer the accommodation, and to implement the policies 
set out in the regulations.  Little Sisters, 794 F.3d at 1164.  The HHS then notifies the issuer or 
TPA of such objection and requires them to provide the contraceptive coverage. 
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Through this accommodation scheme, health insurance issuers bear the costs of 
contraceptive coverage while TPAs can be reimbursed by the objecting organization.  In either 
the EBSA Form accommodation or the Wheaton accommodation (collectively, the 
“Accommodations”), employees receive the coverage specified in the ACA while bearing no 
costs, and the objecting employers are relieved of their duty to directly provide such coverage 
while still complying with the ACA. 
 
B. 
In 1993, Congress enacted RFRA as a response to a specific case: Employment Div., 
Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  Prior to Smith, courts 
analyzed First Amendment Free Exercise claims regarding governmental actions by employing a 
balancing test.  Under this test, courts would weigh the burden a governmental action placed on 
the practice of religion against the compellingness of the governmental interest underlying the 
action.  See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).  The Court in Smith rejected this balancing 
test and instead introduced a new First Amendment standard, holding that “neutral, generally 
applicable laws may be applied to religious practices even when not supported by a compelling 
governmental interest.” Smith, 494 U.S. at 888.  Unsatisfied with this result and the message that 
it sent, Congress set out to re-instill the pre-Smith balancing standard. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) 
(Supp. V 1993).  Almost directly addressing Smith in the creation of RFRA, Congress stated that 
“laws [that are] ‘neutral’ toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws 
intended to interfere with religious exercise.”  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761.  Further, and 
even more clearly, RFRA states that the “Government shall not substantially burden a person’s 
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.” However, 
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RFRA goes on to allow the government to substantially burden a person only if it is done 
through the least restrictive means to achieve a compelling governmental interest.  42 U.S.C. § 
2000bb-1(b) (Lexis 2015).   
In analyzing a claim of a RFRA violation, the initial burden rests on the plaintiff to 
demonstrate that the governmental action imposes a substantial burden on the plaintiff’s sincere 
exercise of religion.  This Court has explained that a substantial burden is imposed on a religious 
exercise if the governmental action: “(1) requires participation in an activity prohibited by a 
sincerely held religious belief, (2) prevents participation in conduct motivated by a sincerely held 
religious belief, or (3) places substantial pressure on an adherent to engage in conduct contrary to 
a sincerely held religious belief.” Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 1125-26.  If the plaintiff can 
establish this prima facie showing, the burden then shifts to the government to demonstrate that 
the law promotes a compelling governmental interest in the least restrictive method possible.  
See Karen A. Jordan, The Contraceptive Mandate: Compelling Interest or Ideology?, 41 J. Legis. 
1, 5 (2014/2015). 
It is important to note that the presence of a substantial burden is a question of law. 
Wheaton, 134 S. Ct. at 2807 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting).  The issue is not whether the plaintiff’s 
faith is being correctly interpreted, but whether the law imposes a substantial burden on that 
plaintiff’s exercise of religion.  “Our only task is to determine whether the claimant’s belief is 
sincere, and if so, whether the government has applied substantial pressure on the claimant to 
violate that belief.” Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 1137. 
It is also important to note the word “substantial.”  When Congress was in the process of 
drafting RFRA, they initially simply used the word “burden” with no modifier.  The additional 
adjective was later added by Congress before the bill was passed for a specific reason. Little 
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Sisters, 794 F.3d at 1176.  Not all burdens imposed by governmental actions are necessarily 
substantial burdens.  The pre-Smith standards restored by RFRA permit the government to 
impose de minimis administrative burdens on religious groups without violating their religious 
liberty. Id. at 1175.  After the plaintiff demonstrates the presence of a burden on religious 
exercise, it is up to the courts to determine whether that burden is indeed substantial. 
Once the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of a substantial burden, the burden of 
proof shifts to the government to demonstrate that the interest promoted by the burdensome law 
is a compelling public interest which is achieved through the least restrictive means possible. 
Contraceptive Mandate, 41 J. Legis. at 5.  There are no clear-cut tests to determine whether a 
governmental interest is compelling and whether the means used to achieve such interest are as 
restrictive as possible.  Instead, courts are somewhat free to make such determinations on a case 
by case basis.  Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the Limits of 
Legislative Power, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 247, 274 (1994).  If the government can meet its burden, the 
challenged law withstands the RFRA claim. 
 
C. 
There are three separate plaintiffs in the case before us.  We believe it is relevant to 
consider the background of each plaintiff in order to better understand their objections and the 
application of the Accommodations to each. 
 
1. 
As explained in the 10th Circuit Court below, “The Little Sisters of the Poor Home for 
the Aged, Denver, Colorado and Little Sisters of the Poor, Baltimore belong to an order of 
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Catholic nuns who devote their lives to care for the elderly.” Little Sisters, 794 F.3d at 1167.  
The employees of the Little Sisters receive their healthcare through a self-insured church plan 
which is not subject to ERISA. Brief for Petitioners at No. ___ p. 11.  This plan is administered 
through a Catholic TPA organization. 
The Catholic faith prohibits sterilization, contraception, and abortion.  As a Catholic 
organization, the Little Sisters find it morally reprehensible on religious grounds to provide their 
employees contraceptive coverage in its healthcare plans.  Id. at p. 10. 
Under the ACA contraceptive mandate, the Little Sisters are now required to provide 
contraceptive coverage to their employees.  However, since it is a religious nonprofit 
organization coming within the qualifications for an accommodation, the Little Sisters may 
relieve themselves of their obligation by either providing their TPA with an ESBA Form or by 
directly contacting the HHS to inform them of their invocation of the accommodation.  If the 
Little Sisters fail to either provide the coverage themselves or properly request an 
accommodation, they may be subject to fines up to millions of dollars.  Id. at p. 1. 
 
2. 
Four universities, Southern Nazarene University, Oklahoma Wesleyan University, 
Oklahoma Baptist University, and Mid-Atlantic Christian University, have brought suit together.  
The court below explained “…they are in slightly different positions insofar as Mid-America 
Christian University uses a church plan and contracts with a TPA, Oklahoma Baptist University 
and Oklahoma Wesleyan use health insurance issuers, and Southern Nazarene contracts with a 
TPA but uses a health insurance issuer for student coverage and employee claims above 
$100,000.” Little Sisters, 794 F.3d at 1168. 
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Each of these “Christ-centered institutions of higher learning” objects to the coverage on 
moral and religious grounds.  Id. at 1168.  Each of the universities is qualified to invoke an 
accommodation.  However, each also objects to the Accommodations on the same moral and 
religious grounds.  Failure to provide the coverage or exercise their right to an accommodation 
can lead each university to a penalty of $100 per employee per day. Id. at 1169. 
 
3. 
The third party to this litigation includes Reaching Souls, a nonprofit group which trains 
people to and provides care to orphans in Africa, India, and Cuba, and Truett-McConnell 
College, a private liberal arts college.  Both of these groups use a self-insured church plan to 
provide healthcare to their employees, which is administered by a TPA.   
These groups, based on their religious convictions, object to providing contraceptive 
coverage that can cause abortions, and similarly object to the accommodation scheme on the 
same moral grounds.  Id. at 1171. 
 
D. 
Each of these three groups (collectively referred to as the “Little Sisters”) has sought a 
preliminary injunction to protect them from the enforcement of the contraceptive mandate even 
through the protection of the accommodation scheme.  We have granted certiorari to resolve the 
issue of whether nonprofit religious organizations may be exempt from the accommodation 
scheme. 
 
II. 
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We now turn to the merits of the case.  Two issues are presented before us: (1) whether 
the regulatory method for nonprofit religious employers to comply with HHS’s contraceptive 
mandate satisfies RFRA; and (2) whether the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment 
allows HHS to make distinctions among various nonprofit religious employers.  We address each 
issue in turn and find that the Accommodations are in accordance with both RFRA and the 
Establishment Clause. 
 
A. 
1. 
RFRA requires that the government “shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of 
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability” unless the government 
“demonstrates that application of the burden to the person – (1) is in furtherance of a compelling 
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. SEC 2000bb-1 (Lexis 2015). 
In applying RFRA, the first step in our analysis is to determine whether the 
Accommodations inflict a substantial burden on the plaintiffs’ exercise of religion.  The Little 
Sisters argue that they sincerely morally object to any participation in providing contraceptives 
to women, however indirect their role may be.  But, if they do not participate in any way, they 
will be forced to pay lofty penalties.  Thus, the Little Sisters contend, they are forced to choose 
between their sincere religious beliefs and their funds – a choice which inflicts a substantial 
burden on them. Brief for Petitioners at No. ___ p. 23.  The Little Sisters argue that the 
Accommodations do not relieve them of any complicity, for the Little Sisters are in a contractual 
relationship with the parties providing the contraceptive coverage.  They further argue that the 
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lower courts erred in holding that no substantial burden exists, for the HHS has conceded that the 
Little Sister’s beliefs are sincere.  Therefore, because the Little Sisters are sincerely burdened by 
the accommodation scheme, the burden of proof shifts to the government. 
The Little Sisters make a few errors in their reasoning.  First, they deflate the standard 
which must be met by confusing the meaning of “substantial burden.”  In the Little Sisters’ 
argument, they assume that the existence of a substantial burden is analogous to the existence of 
a sincere belief.  They contend that the lower court was in error because the Little Sisters do 
sincerely believe that participating in the Accommodations would be morally abhorrent.  This is 
incorrect.  Whether a substantial burden exists does not wholly rest upon whether there is a 
sincere religious belief; this is part of the inquiry, but it is not the be all and end all.  To receive 
RFRA’s protection, the plaintiff must show that the religious belief is sincere, but additionally 
must demonstrate that this sincere belief is substantially burdened; it is not enough to just show a 
sincere belief.  As set out above, the question of whether a substantial burden exists is a question 
for the court.  While a court cannot question the correctness of a religious belief, it can assess the 
burden felt by a person with those religious beliefs.   
In Hobby Lobby, this Court found that the contraceptive mandate of the ACA, with no 
Accommodations, imposed a substantial burden on the plaintiff.  In doing so, the Court 
referenced the case Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).  This case set the precedent 
that a court cannot decide at what point work becomes objectionable on moral grounds to the 
worker; the directness of a worker’s involvement is not relevant when considering the 
objectionableness of the work.  Similarly, the Court in Hobby Lobby found that a court could not 
decide at what level of participation organizations violate their religious beliefs.  The Court went 
on to hold that because Hobby Lobby sincerely felt that their religious beliefs would be violated 
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by complying with the contraceptive mandate, and Hobby Lobby must choose between this 
violation or paying large sums of money, a substantial burden was imposed on the company.  
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751. 
In the case at bar, we are not deciding whether the Little Sisters are violating their 
religious beliefs.  The Little Sisters have argued that their beliefs are sincere and that they 
sincerely feel these beliefs are being violated, and we find that they are.  The proper question 
before us is not whether there is a sincere burden felt by the Little Sisters, but whether the 
Accommodations place a substantial burden on the Little Sisters.  
“In determining whether a law or policy applies substantial pressure on a claimant to 
violate his beliefs, the court considers how the law or policy being challenged actually operates 
and affects religious exercise.” Little Sisters, 794 F.3d at 1177.  In drafting RFRA, Congress 
specifically chose to use the word “substantial” to modify “burden” in order to exclude de 
minimis burdens; only great burdens, or substantial burdens, are protected by RFRA.  Id. at 
1176.  With this in mind, we turn to the burden the Accommodations place on the Little Sisters. 
While we recognize that the Accommodations may cause a burden sincerely felt by the 
Little Sisters, this burden is not enough to qualify as a substantial burden.  The contraceptive 
mandate itself, with no accommodation scheme, would cause a substantial burden, as this Court 
held in Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779.  The Accommodations, however, relieve the Little 
Sisters of this substantial burden by releasing them of their duty to provide their employees with 
the contraceptive coverage.  While the Little Sisters are in a contractual relationship with the 
parties, it does not necessarily follow that they are complicit in all contraceptive coverage.  
However, if the Little Sisters feel so strongly about this theory of complicity, they could ask the 
insurers to outsource the contraceptive portion of the insurance plan to a different party with no 
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relationship with the Little Sisters.  See University of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606 (7th 
Cir. 2015).  Because unobjectionable options clearly exist for the Little Sisters to avoid monetary 
penalties, the connection between the Little Sisters and the actual provision of the coverage is too 
attenuated to be considered a substantial burden. 
Were the ACA to cause the Little Sisters to behave in a certain way or perform some 
action which in itself violates their religious beliefs, this case would turn out differently.   
However, as the 6th Circuit Court explained, under the Accommodations, “The only difference 
in conduct is on the part of the insurance issuer or third-party administrator” Mich. Catholic 
Conf. v. Burwell, 755 F.3d 372, 388 (6th Cir. 2014).  Rather than forcing religious nonprofits to 
act in a certain way, the Accommodations relieve the nonprofits from such actions.  Because 
they do not force the organizations to modify their behavior, they do not impose a substantial 
burden on the Little Sisters. 
Furthermore, the Little Sisters neglect to recognize a significant fact.  The Little Sisters 
are not responsible for their employees’ entitlement to contraceptive coverage.  The coverage is 
triggered by the ACA.  See E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 793 F.3d 449, 459 (5th Cir. 2015).  
When the Little Sisters submit an EBSA Form or notify the HHS of their exercise of the 
accommodation, they do not cause the employees to receive the coverage.  “Employees and 
beneficiaries will receive contraceptive coverage, but that coverage will be ‘despite plaintiffs' 
religious objections, not because of them.’”  Michigan Catholic, 755 F.3d 372 at 389 (citation 
omitted).  The employers are a mere link in the chain created by the ACA.  By electing the 
accommodation, the nonprofit entity removes its link from the chain and the other links come 
together.  By removing itself from the process of providing the coverage, any burden placed on 
the organization is relieved. 
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Simply filing a form or mailing a notice of objection cannot be the type of burden 
Congress had in mind when drafting RFRA.  The majority of courts have concluded the same.  
As the 2nd Circuit Court explained, “Cases finding a substantial burden under RFRA have … 
involved much more significant burdens on religious objectors.” Catholic Health Care Sys. v. 
Burwell, 796 F.3d 207, 219 (2d Cir. 2015).  In past cases when this Court has found religions to 
be substantially burdened, it is because people have been prevented from engaging in their 
religious practices.  (See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 
418, 425-26, 126 S. Ct. 1211, 163 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (2006); Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S.Ct. 853, 862 
(2015)).  These burdens on religious beliefs are much greater than the burdens placed on the 
Little Sisters herein.  In the case at bar, the Little Sisters are free to exercise their religion.   
Accordingly, we hold that the Accommodations do not place any substantial burden on 
religious nonprofit organizations. 
 
2. 
Since the Accommodations do not place a substantial burden on the Little Sisters, the 
analysis is complete and the Accommodations do not violate RFRA.  Assuming, arguendo, that 
the Accommodations do place a substantial burden on the Little Sisters, the next step would be to 
analyze if a compelling governmental interest is achieved through these means.  We find that 
there is a compelling governmental interest: namely, providing women full healthcare coverage. 
It is well established that one of the primary concerns of our government is the health and 
safety of the people.  When creating the ACA, Congress specifically found that more people 
would take advantage of preventive services if they were provided as part of their general 
healthcare plans provided by their employers.  It naturally follows that requiring employers to 
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include this type of coverage in their healthcare plans would improve the public health.  
Therefore, there is a compelling governmental interest in requiring employers to provide full 
healthcare coverage to their employees. 
To apply this general sentiment to the specific services set out in the ACA, we need look 
no further than my dissent in Hobby Lobby:  
…the Government has shown that the contraceptive coverage for which the ACA 
provides furthers compelling interests in public health and women’s well being. Those 
interests are concrete, specific, and demonstrated by a wealth of empirical evidence. To 
recapitulate, the mandated contraception coverage enables women to avoid the health 
problems unintended pregnancies may visit on them and their children. The coverage 
helps safeguard the health of women for whom pregnancy may be hazardous, even life 
threatening. And the mandate secures benefits wholly unrelated to pregnancy, preventing 
certain cancers, menstrual disorders, and pelvic pain.  
 
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (citations omitted).  It is undeniable 
that the contraceptive coverage promotes the public health, and is thus a compelling interest. 
While the majority in Hobby Lobby did not explicitly hold that the government’s interest 
in providing women full healthcare is compelling, they assumed as much.  Justice Kennedy, in 
his concurrence, went further than the majority.  He held that the government sufficiently 
demonstrated that their interest is compelling.  Id. at 2785 (Kennedy, J. concurring).  In line with 
these views, we expressly find that providing women full healthcare is indeed a compelling 
governmental interest. 
 
3. 
Finally, assuming arguendo that we need to address the last prong of the RFRA standard, 
the Accommodations are indeed the least restrictive methods of accomplishing the compelling 
governmental interest. 
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The ESBA Form does not require much information.  In fact, it only requires the bare 
minimum of information necessary to provide the coverage mandated by the ACA.  This 
accommodation could not possibly be any less restrictive if it is still to be effective.  Further, 
even if a nonprofit finds the EBSA Form too outrageous, the group can choose to forego the 
EBSA Form and instead simply notify the HHS of its election to take the accommodation.  We 
cannot think of any less restrictive method through which the government can achieve its goals. 
In Hobby Lobby, this Court used the EBSA Form accommodation as an example of a less 
restrictive means of providing the contraceptive coverage.  The Court stated that the 
accommodation was an alternative to providing the full coverage which has a greater respect for 
religious liberty. Id. at 2759.  Further, the Court went on to say that the effect of this 
accommodation on women “would be precisely zero.”  Id. at 2760.  Since that decision, this 
Court has gone a step even further in respecting religious liberty by implementing the Wheaton 
accommodation.  Today, we are following the Hobby Lobby decision by finding that the 
Accommodations are indeed the least restrictive means of implementing the compelling 
governmental interest. 
Justice Scalia’s dissent suggests that the HHS should fully exempt all religiously 
affiliated nonprofit organizations from the contraceptive mandate of the ACA, just as houses of 
worship are exempt.  To fully exempt all religious nonprofits would be both too costly and 
impractical.  First, if it were the government’s obligation to provide the coverage directly for all 
such employees, the burden on the government would be tremendous.  Second, if we adopt 
Justice Scalia’s stance, then it is quite predictable that the next case will be a challenge from a 
for-profit corporation eligible for the Accommodations seeking to be fully exempt.  If this Court 
continues to allow more and more groups to be fully exempt from the ACA, we would be 
18 
 
undermining Congress’s goal in enacting the ACA in the first place.  It is not the Court’s place to 
rewrite the Act.  Not every group claiming a religious burden can be fully exempt; the line must 
be drawn somewhere in order for the ACA to work.  We believe that the Accommodations 
available to religious nonprofits, such as the Little Sisters, strike the appropriate balance. 
 
B. 
In addition to their RFRA claim, the Little Sisters also raise a constitutional argument.  
They argue that by extending the exemption only to churches and their auxiliaries, the 
Accommodations violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  However, the law 
has been making this distinction in many areas for years.  Therefore, this claim is dismissed. 
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion…” U.S. Const. amend. I (Lexis 2015).  This clause 
was written into the Constitution to prevent the entanglement of church and state, including the 
prevention of government from interfering in church matters.  Under the Establishment Clause, 
the government cannot set guidelines for churches or discriminate against or in favor of one 
religion over another.  There must be a clear wall of separation between church and state.  See 
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504 (1947).1 
The Little Sisters argue that HHS is discriminating among nonprofit religious employers 
by fully exempting some groups but merely providing the Accommodations to others.  The Little 
Sisters fail to recognize that the distinction made by the HHS is a long-standing differentiation 
made in various areas of law, such as taxation and employment discrimination.  It is a widely 
                                                          
1 See Construction and Application of Establishment Clause of First Amendment -- U.S. Supreme Court Cases, 15 
A.L.R. Fed. 2d 573, 19 (1978).  Ginsburg’s jurisprudential history demonstrates that she supports a “wall of 
separation” approach to determine whether the Establishment Clause has been violated. 
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recognized notion that organizations whose primary purpose is religious should be treated 
differently than other groups, even if the other groups also have religious ties.  Were the 
government to interfere, condone, or promote any or all religions, that would give rise to a valid 
Establishment Clause claim. However, we see no indication here that the HHS is violating the 
wall of separation between church and state, and thus the HHS is not acting in violation of the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
Under the Internal Revenue Code, certain nonprofit organizations are exempt from 
taxation.  It is not a requirement to be exempt that these organizations are religious, but a 
category of exempt nonprofits are those established for religious purposes.  See 26 U.S.C. § 
501(c)(3) (Lexis 2015).  This exempt category does not include all religiously affiliated nonprofit 
organizations; rather, it only includes those which are formed for religious purposes.  Thus, 
nonprofit organizations which have religious ties but are not organized for primarily religious 
purposes, such as places of worship, are not exempt.   This is de facto the same rule which the 
ACA sets out.  Since the courts have never been concerned that the IRC is in violation of the 
Establishment Clause, there should be no concern that this same distinction is made in a different 
context. 
Similarly, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has an exemption for religious 
groups. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-1(a) (Lexis 2015).  Title VII was enacted to eliminate 
discrimination in employment based on categories such as race, religion, age, and gender.  
Section 702 provides an exemption from religious discrimination for religious organizations.  
However, not all organizations with religious ties are automatically exempt.  To qualify as an 
exempt religious organization, the group must have a “purpose and character [which] are 
primarily religious.” EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 618 (9th Cir. 1988).  In 
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Corporation of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 
U.S. 327, this Court specifically held that this line drawing, this Title VII exemption, did not 
violate the Establishment Clause.  The ACA, by fully exempting places of worship but not 
exempting other religious organizations, draws a line, just as Title VII draws a line.  As our 
brethren held in Amos, we too hold that this type of line drawing is not in violation of the 
Establishment Clause. 
If this Court chose to adopt the reasoning advanced by the Little Sisters and did fully 
exempt all groups claiming to object on religious grounds, the government would never be able 
to enact any measure disfavored by any group with religious views, for every organization could 
claim to be exempt on religious grounds.  This Court has never endorsed a blanket exemption for 
all religiously tied organizations in any context, and we refuse to do so now.  Again, the line 
must be drawn somewhere, and Congress’s choice to draw that line in the same way it has been 
drawn in other areas of law is not unconstitutional. 
In the past, the only times this Court has found Establishment Clause violations when the 
State has drawn a line among religious organizations have been when preference is given to 
certain denominations but not others.  As this Court explained in Larson v. Velente, 456 U.S. 
228 (1982), there is an underlying “principle of denominational neutrality” within the 
Establishment Clause. Id. at 246.  This principle is violated whenever a government does not 
treat all religious denominations in the same manner.  The ACA does not make any distinctions 
between denominations, nor do the Little Sisters contend it does.  Since there has been no 
improper denominational line drawing, there has been no Establishment Clause violation. 
Further, no U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has found an Establishment Clause violation 
within the accommodation scheme, including the 8th Circuit.  See Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. HHS, 
21 
 
No, 14-1507, 2015 WL 5449491 (8th Cir. Sept. 17, 2015).  We will not upset this longstanding 
precedent and agreement of the circuits with our decision today. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Accommodations stand. 
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Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice Breyer joins in Part I, concurring in the judgment2 
 
I. 
While I agree with the final result of the majority opinion, I wholly disagree with the 
rationale used to get there.  Requiring nonprofit religious organizations to file an EBSA Form or 
to notify the HHS of their objection does impose a substantial burden on these groups.  Echoing 
the majority in Hobby Lobby, I made clear in my concurrence that the government’s interest in 
the contraceptive mandate of the ACA is compelling.  Today I expressly hold that the 
government’s interest in providing women with full health coverage is indeed compelling.  
While the EBSA Form was not the least restrictive means of serving this interest, the 
accommodation set out in Wheaton, 134 S. Ct. 2806, is the least restrictive means of serving the 
compelling governmental interest.  Because the interest is so compelling and the least restrictive 
method is being used to promote this interest, the burden is justified.  As such, RFRA is not 
violated. 
 
II. 
To address the Little Sisters’ claim that the Accommodations violate the Establishment 
Clause, I invoke the coercion test set out in my concurrence in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 
492 U.S. 573 (1989).  Under this coercion test, the “government may not coerce anyone to 
support or participate on any religion or its exercise.” Id. at 627.  Whenever the government 
coerces people to believe in certain religious beliefs or participate in certain religious practices, 
                                                          
2 Breyer’s jurisprudence on the Establishment Clause illustrates that he believes a multitude of factors should be 
taken into consideration when determining whether that Clause has been violated.  Coercion is one such factor, 
but it is not the end all be all in his eyes. See Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98, 127 (2001); 
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698 (2005). 
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the Establishment Clause is violated.  This theory of coercion was made clear in Lee v. 
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).  In that case, the questionable action was a prayer recitation at a 
public school graduation.  We held that while the students were not physically coerced into 
participating in the prayer, such as requiring them to recite the prayer or stand up for it, the 
prayer did cause psychological coercion.  When children are surrounded by their peers, parents, 
and teachers, they can be easily pressured into conforming to the school’s religious practice (the 
practice in this instance being the prayer).  “It is a tenet of the First Amendment that the State 
cannot require one of its citizens to forfeit his or her rights and benefits as the price of resisting 
conformance to state-sponsored religious practice.” Id. at 596.  The Establishment Clause was 
violated because the students were coerced into participating in a religious practice. 
The case at bar can be easily decided when applying the coercion test.  No reasonable 
person would think that the act of providing women healthcare is a religious exercise.  The ACA 
does not require anyone to believe in a certain religion.  Similarly, the Accommodations do not 
coerce the Little Sisters, legally or psychologically, to participate in a religious practice.  
However, the Little Sisters do not even make such an argument.  The Little Sisters contend that 
the Establishment Clause violation stems from the government’s distinction between houses of 
worship and other types of religious nonprofits.  In this way, the Little Sisters misinterpret and 
misapply the Establishment Clause.  Since the Accommodations are in no way coercive, they do 
not violate the Establishment Clause.   
For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the result. 
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Justice Scalia, joined in whole by Justice Alito and Justice Thomas, joined in parts I and III by 
Chief Justice Roberts, dissenting 
 
The majority’s decision today takes a step backwards from our country’s founding principal of 
tolerance towards religious freedom and goes directly against our decision in Hobby Lobby.  
Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s ruling. 
 
I. 
The majority contends that there is no substantial burden placed on nonprofit religious 
organizations thanks to the accommodation system.  However, it is not the Court’s role to decide 
whether a group feels a burden on their religious conscience.  The Court may only determine 
whether the belief is sincere, not whether it is valid.  See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 
(1981).  On this point, the majority has already conceded that the Little Sisters’ belief that the 
Accommodations place a substantial burden on them is sincere.  This should be the end of the 
analysis.  But, the majority goes on to hold that the link between the Little Sisters and the actual 
providence of contraceptives is too attenuated to be considered a substantial burden.  This goes 
absolutely against the central holding of one of the most important cases in this jurisprudence: 
Thomas, 450 U.S. 707.  In that case, this Court held that the court cannot decide at what point a 
worker’s involvement becomes objectionable; yet that is exactly what the majority is doing 
today.  The Court is overstepping its boundaries and creating a frightening precedent: one where 
a court may ignore a citizen’s sincere religious belief when applying a statute created for the 
purpose of protecting that sincere religious belief.  Furthermore, the fact that Congress has 
exempted some religious groups and has provided this accommodation scheme implies that they 
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understood that the ACA would impose a burden on religious groups.  If the interest is as 
compelling as the HHS insists, then it must be only a substantial burden that could cause them to 
exempt and accommodate some groups. 
The Little Sisters claim their burden is caused by the choice the Accommodations force 
them to make: They must choose between betraying their religious convictions and paying a 
large monetary penalty for not providing the coverage.  This monetary burden is comparable to 
the burden felt by Hobby Lobby.  In Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, this Court found that the 
imposition of these pecuniary penalties did cause a substantial burden.  To hold that in Hobby 
Lobby a monetary burden was enough to qualify as a substantial burden under RFRA but that the 
same burden in this case is not enough is utter jabberwash.  The majority claims to honor this 
Court’s precedent, yet their holding today suggests otherwise. 
 
II. 
The majority goes on to hold that the interests asserted by the ACA are compelling.  As 
the majority assumed in Hobby Lobby, I too will assume that the interest is compelling, for I 
respect the precedent this Court sets forth.  However, I will note that the interest cannot be all 
that compelling, considering Congress has already worked exemptions into the ACA.  If it was 
THAT compelling, there would be no exemptions. 
 
III. 
The Accommodations are not, as the majority holds, the least restrictive means to 
accomplish the government’s compelling interest.  The majority in this opinion attempts to use 
the majority opinion in Hobby Lobby to support its holding and in doing so, turns the Hobby 
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Lobby opinion on its head.  While Justice Alito did say that the EBSA accommodation 
“provide[s] greater respect for religious liberty,” he did not say that the accommodation is the 
least restrictive means, or that it does not impose a substantial burden on religious groups.  In 
fact, he made it very clear in his opinion that he was specifically not making any finding with 
respect to the effect of the Accommodations on the religious nonprofits. Id. at 2782. 
There exists a very obvious less restrictive method to enforce the ACA – let the 
government handle it.  Churches and their auxiliaries are wholly exempt from providing the 
contraceptive coverage.  There is no sufficient reason why this exemption cannot be extended to 
religiously affiliated nonprofit groups.  Churches are exempt because the government recognizes 
that asking them to provide the coverage would be too great a burden on their religious 
consciences.  This very same logic extends to religious nonprofits.  The nuns of the Little Sisters 
have devoted their lives to the Catholic faith and for what it stands.  Surely, the HHS and the 
majority cannot mean that nuns are lower on the totem pole of religion than priests or rabbis; yet 
that is exactly what their ruling is implying.  I cannot, in my good conscience, stand for such a 
contention. 
Because RFRA has been violated so egregiously, there is no need to address the 
Establishment Clause argument.  Enough damage has been done to this Court’s precedent and 
this country’s history to warrant a reversal on statutory grounds.   
Accordingly, I would hold that the Accommodations offered to religious nonprofit 
organizations violate RFRA. 
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Chief Justice Roberts, dissenting 
 
I have joined in part with Justice Scalia’s dissent.  However, I would come to a very 
different conclusion on the issue of whether the interest promoted is compelling.   
In Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, (2006), 
this Court faced a RFRA challenge to a ban on a drug used in a religious ceremony.  The Court 
held that the prohibition placed a substantial burden on the church’s free exercise of religion.  
We then went on to find that the interest underlying the general prohibition on the drug was not 
compelling enough to outweigh the substantial burden on the group.  Specifically, the Court 
stated that “Congress’ determination that [the drug] should be listed [in the Controlled Substance 
Act] simply does not provide a categorical answer that relieves the Government of the obligation 
to shoulder its burden under RFRA.” Id. at 432.  The fact that the drug was named in the 
Controlled Substance Act (“CSA”), 21 U.S.C.S. § 812(c) (Lexis 2015), was not sufficient proof 
that the government had a compelling interest in prohibiting this religious group from using the 
drug in their ceremonies. 
To this end, the Court also pointed out that there was already an exemption in place for 
the religious use of a drug otherwise prohibited under the CSA: Peyote.  The Court explained 
that "It is established in our strict scrutiny jurisprudence that 'a law cannot be regarded as 
protecting an interest 'of the highest order' . . . when it leaves appreciable damage to that 
supposedly vital interest unprohibited.'" Id. at 433, quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. 
v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993), quoting Florida Star v. B.J. F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).  The 
Court reasoned that if an exemption existed under the statute to relieve some groups of the 
burden, the government’s need to impose the substantial burden upon other groups could not be 
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all that compelling.  In light of these reasons, the Court held that RFRA allowed the religious 
group to use the drug in their religious rituals notwithstanding the CSA. 
In the case at bar, the HHS maintains that it has a compelling interest in providing 
preventive healthcare to women.  However, one cannot assume that the interest is compelling 
just because the preventive healthcare is included in the ACA.  The HHS has the burden of 
showing that there is a compelling interest in requiring the Little Sisters in particular to partake 
in the contraceptive mandate.  The HHS has not met this high standard.  Furthermore, 
exemptions do exist to the contraceptive mandate.  As in O Centro, 546 U.S. 418, the fact that 
numerous religious employers (all churches, synagogues, temples, mosques, and their auxiliaries 
throughout the entire nation) are fully exempt necessarily leads to the inference that this interest 
is not a highly compelling interest; for if it was, such a broad category would not be exempt. 
In conjunction with parts I and III of Justice Scalia’s dissent, I too dissent from the 
majority opinion and would hold the Accommodations invalid under RFRA. 
 
